

## Sacraments

(Notes de cours, conférence)

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Conformity of Spiritual life with life of the body = 2 pp. } Mercyhurst College

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*De Sacramentis in Communi*

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IV Cg., c. 56.

III<sup>a</sup>, pp. 60-65.

Conformity of Spiritual life with life of the body:

- Man attains to perfection 2ter:

(a) First, in regard to his own person:

1<sup>o</sup> ~~spiritually~~ absolutely, 2<sup>o</sup> as to something.

(1<sup>o</sup>) absolutely 3ter:

(α) by generation, whereby a man begins to be and to ~~live~~ live: corresponding to this in the spiritual order: Baptism.

(β) by growth whereby a man is brought to perfect size and strength: Confirmation.

(γ) by nourishment, whereby life and strength are preserved to man: The Eucharist.

(2<sup>o</sup>) ~~Secondly~~ in regard to the whole community of the

2<sup>o</sup> This would be enough if man imperible life, both corporally and spiritually: because man is liable at times to both corporal and spiritual infirmity, he needs a cure from this infirmity.

Cure twofold:

(α) One is the healing that restores health: Sacrament of Penance.

(β) The other is the restoration of former vigour by means of suitable diet and exercise: Extreme Unction, which removes the remainders of sin and prepares man for final glory.

- (b) In regard to the whole community, 2<sup>nd</sup>ly:
- (a) First, by receiving power to rule the community and to exercise public acts.  
Order: priests offer sacrifices not ~~for~~ for themselves only, but also for the people.
  - (B) Secondly, in regard to natural propagation: this is accomplished by Matrimony both in the corporal and in the spiritual life: since it is not only a sacrament but also a function of nature.

### Confirmation

End of family: generation & perfection of substance: <sup>esse</sup>  
End of civil society: perfection of operation: bonum esse.  
Confirmation gives spiritual marriage: makes one a citizen of Kingdom: Sac. of Kingdom. Unbaptized only indirectly. Defense of Faith: 7/2/4/3<sup>m</sup>.  
Importance of confirmation: "multo major gloria."  
Nunc sollicitudo. Parents must ask. In Spain, & Orient. Perhaps one day universal because of growing sudden dejection.  
Christ King & Mary Queen: Confirmed their immediate subjects.

Introduct.

The end of the sacraments: to reach God in his transcendence: to know Him "sicut est".

1. Quid God in his house?

Divine otherness.

Not just the most perfect of all beings. Scale does not convey what He is. Through creatures can be known only by way of negation → caligo.

Supernatural:

God has life his own "in se".

creatures no right to this - but only to what is due them according to their own nature.

Sanctification:

Elevation to divine otherness: participation by free gift: grace.

2. Divine condescendence

Elevation of creature to capacity, by grace, of reaching God in his otherness, act of liberality - of mercy as elevating inferior.

Actually, grace given from beginning, to Angels & man.

Some Angels fell. Preferred good in proportion with own nature to transcendent good. Not because latter not better, but because not their private, exclusive good.

invidia  
diabolici mors  
Sap. 1. 24

Man fell & desire of sc. of good & evil → beyond uncertainty proper to human life; wanted to be their own Providence. Sense does not lead to that certainty. Covered by senses.

Rement on contingency  
in reception of Sacram.  
& sc. of good and evil

Divine mercy in Pardon - but on condition justice be done to atone for offense. We must be redeemed. Perfection of Redempt. with B. Virgin. Eve had sinned against God & neighbour: common good - directly. Original Concept of Man from woman

3. Incarnation: Word made flesh.

To redeem us, sent His Only Begotten Son.

What does it mean for God to become visible?

What do we mean by visibility on our level?

- proper meaning according to first impression.

- analogical by extension.

God becomes visible in first sense: Highest (Actus purus, intelligere ipsum) united to lowest, darkness of sense & intellig. in potency.

(2)

<sup>& tangibility</sup>  
Visibility of God, in X, according to sense - most  
important: He has decided to join us in what  
is most proper to man as man - even as to  
material nourishment. Remember he ~~passed~~  
~~that~~ he ate { at beginning of public life: temptation by devil,  
at end, after resurrection & before ascension.  
No idealistic contempt for matter - everything given  
fulness, even that which almost is not. Thomas.

What does it mean for God to become passible?

By fulness of mercy, assumes our weakness in the manner  
in which it affects us: sensibly - even to physical  
suffering. No contempt, no negation or ignoring of  
physical suffering.

In fact, redeeming passion, by which X merits our  
salvation and meaning of salvation, fulfilled in the  
flesh.

Hence the unequalled role, function, of the sensible in work  
of salvation.

Now IV Contra Gentes C. 56: Of the necessity of the Sacraments.

Thank for patience, undivided attention.  
Have spoken not independently of one subject so  
divine, but also necessary - to necessity  
every corporal may do for a general  
Forgive me for my inarticulate English -  
unimportant, ill chosen words, &  
cumbersome syntax and mispronunciation.  
Forget it all, except the subject.

# On the necessity of the Sacraments

IV Cg. 56.

Christ's death is a universal cause of our salvation.

Quid universal cause?

Two kinds of universality.

Why under the guise of visible signs. Why?

1° ~~These~~ Sense knowledge is the principle of all our knowledge.

Why? Not pure spirits.

In natural order, sense, the principle of all our certitude.

Now, "God provides for man according to the condition of his nature." - Thus "man is humbled through confessing that he is subject

~~Relate this to what we saw yesterday on sacraments~~ to corporeal things, seeing that he receives assistance through them.

2° The universal cause of our salvation: the incarnate Word.

Fitting that the remedies be proportioned to this cause: that in them, the divine power should work invisibly under visible signs.

3° Cf. text. ~~Summa Theol. q. 61, a. 1, c. 2.~~

3° "Man is prone to direct his activity chiefly towards material things. lest therefore it should be too hard for man to be drawn away entirely from bodily actions, bodily exercise was offered to him in the sacraments." In q. 61, a. 1, c.

Sense no longer perfectly subject to reason, after fall. Hence, growing importance of sense.

4° Cf. Cg. 3° .....

Take, in particular, the instance of wine in the Eucharist.

On the other hand, it is not unreasonable... for they derive their instrumental efficacy from X's institution, not from their nature abstr.

## On the nature of the Sacraments

1. - A thing may be called a sacrament { either because it contains a hidden sanctity: sacred sacrament  
or because it has some relationship to this sanctity:  
i.e. relationship { as cause  
as sign, or any other relation.  
Here, as sign: qd potest hoc cogn.  
refracts. blind as se.

2. - Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover the unknown by means of the known.

A sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man: the sign of a holy thing, so far as it makes men holy.

Hence, difference between the sensible creature, which may be called sacraments in so far as they signify something holy, w/ div. wisdom and goodness; and sacraments as here understood; for the sensible things thus considered do not sanctify us.

3. What do they signify?

They are ordained to signify our sanctification, in which three things may be considered:

- the Cause of our sanctification: the Passion of X.: it's a reminder of the past.
- the form of our sanctification: grace & the virtues: an indication (demonstration) of what is effected in us by the Passion: grace.
- the ultimate end of " : eternal life: prognostic foretelling of the future.

4. What things?

The Sacraments concern our sanctification as it is in the power of God, it is for Him to decide what things should be used for man's sanctification. Hence we must use those things determined by divine Institution.

Note, the selection is strictly divine.

5. Why also words? Why words should be used may be seen by a consideration of { - the Cause of sanctification;  
- the subject;  
- sacramental sign.  
The ~~same~~ signs ~~signify~~ three things and, in each case, it is fitting that words be ~~added~~ added to the sensible signs:

- In regard to the Cause of our sanctification: the Word incarnate, to whom the Sacraments have a certain conformity: the word is joined to the sensible sign as the Word to the flesh.
- Considered on the part of man who is sanctified: compound of body and soul: the sacramental remedy touches the body through the sensible element; reaches the soul through faith in the words. ~~We see and touch the element and believe the word signifying the element as signifying our sanctification.~~
- On the part of the sacramental signification:



- On the part of the sacramental signification: What is it that signifies? Things and words.

Of all signs used by man, words take the first place. We need special vocal signs designed to convey our thoughts about things. Words are not natural, do not signify naturally, but by institution. Infinity of reason as multitude and variety of conceptions, and as to many distinct aspects of things. Reason is selective and expresses this selection and distinction by words.

Thus water may signify many things, such as cleansing by reason of its humidity, or refreshment by reason of its being cool.

Therefore, to insure perfection of sacramental signification, it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words. "Certain words", selected by divine institution, otherwise indetermination. Yet words according to their original meaning.

Thus, when I say, "I baptize thee" it is clear that we use water not in any sense, but to signify spiritual cleansing.

While the words must be spoken, they operate, not because spoken, but because believed in accordance with the sense of the words which is held by Faith.

~~Proposition~~

Thus, the sacrament, as a sign, is a composite whole, intrinsically constituted by a matter which is the things (water, oil...) and a determining form, the words. It is this whole which signifies sanctification.

Ponderanda: (1) The sensible things are words, in a sense. All existing things are words spoken by God, within Himself, expressed in the Word Who is the Son, and "per quem omnia facta sunt". They express their Creator to a degree. In the sacrament, the things are words in a more profound sense, by reason of Divine institution to signify sanctification. These "things" should be referred to the flesh of the Incarnate Word. (Note repugnance to word "flesh")

(2) Words proper have more significative power: they are wholly for the sake of signifying from mind to mind. For that reason they are employed to ~~signify~~ give further determination to the sacrament (that is, sign). Yet, the composite of sensible things that are words in a sense, and of words proper, forms one whole signification, a signification that is one.

(3) This one, in a way "one word". Just as the Word made flesh is one Person. This one word signifies the Cause of sanctification, the form, and the end. It is an indivisible word, for the matter & the form taken separately ~~do~~ have no sacramental signification.

(4) Even the form of the sacrament, the words proper, are sensible, audible. Note that they are, in a peculiar way, both material, sensible, and spiritual. Their origin is in the mind, in the conception they signify first. Yet, they are also vocal sounds. There would be no expression without the sound; there would be no significant sound without the conception in the mind. And hence, even the form of the sacrament reaches that principle which is first to us, the sensible. Thus, the Word made flesh is referred to by the very words we use, yet imperfectly, because our words are not natures. The latter is furnished by the matter, the things. - Note the function of the "arkfact" in the sacraments and be reminded of reason 3 for the fittingness of the sacraments as "visible" signs.

(5) Words signify by human institution. In the sacrament, these words now signify ultimately by divine institution. Note, here again, the condescension. God meets us at what is first to us. The composite of things and words, the one word, signifies the Word who is the Image of the Father, and in Whom we shall see God, by the grace conferred to us ~~by~~ <sup>in</sup> the sacraments, God, Who is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

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# The Sacraments' Principal Effect: Grace

How are the sacraments a cause of grace?

Two kinds of causes: { principal: works by power of its own form, & effect likened to this. (House likened to conception, not to travel & hammer)  
instrumental: works only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent, & effect likened, not to instrument but to principal agent.

Now grace is a participated

likeness to the Divine nature, by it we are, as St. Peter says: "partakers of the Divine Nature." Hence, God alone, in His divinity, can be principal cause of grace. II, 1, 4.

But the sacraments as instrumental causes: yet truly, since they are instituted for the purpose of conferring grace.

Hence, the sacraments are both causes and signs. Note how the sensible has been peculiarly elevated. For not just sign that we receive grace, but that which is a sign, also a cause: ordained to something sacred as cause.

Twofold action: III 62, 1, 2<sup>m</sup>.

Hence, grace not in sacrament as in a subject or base, but as in instrument:

"virtus fluit et incompleta in se natura", "esse fluit et incompletum."

In this sense, sacrament "contains" grace; "esse transiens per modum accidentis."

Thus a spiritual power is conferred upon something corporeal and visible: III 62, 4, 1<sup>m</sup> this the indispensable "link".

Whence this power?

Sec. produce grace as instrumental cause.

God is the principal cause. Yet, we say that it is the passion of X. How are we to understand this? Itic III 62, 5, c.

## The division of the Sacraments

Call attention to Faith.

1° Certitude of Faith.

2° Not something vague. Grace engaged in the sensible. No short-cut. Consider first the advantage:

3° Vagueness and generality must be dispelled: One help. <sup>Continua - absolute, you know, forward and on.</sup> <sup>To be left to self and in the vague to</sup> <sup>virtuoman</sup> <sup>but tangibly my solution.</sup>

Faith comprises two things:

- power to adhere - from Holy Ghost in Baptism.

- "what" is to be believed: fides et audientia.

Having been baptized and believing, Cornelius still had to see Peter... just what...

The faithful often take for granted that it is enough to be ready to believe.

In a way yes. But the faith is for the sake of knowing certain divine truths.

Now, the number of the Sacraments: IV op.

As we move on we must not lose sight of the reason and function of the sensible in the work of the Incarnation. It is true the very humble means are employed for the very highest purpose. Yet, lest we be blinded to points of judgment this contrast repugnant, we must ponder the wisdom of it: Attaining a firm usque ad finem. Of the sacraments too may be said "nigra sum sed firmata". Dark by what they are in themselves; beautiful by what they mean and by what they cause.

God humbles himself in the manner and means he employs to confer upon us the grace which makes us like unto him. Yet He does this because of His Mercy. If we felt justified in this repugnance, we would be like that ungrateful person who, having been raised from the mud into which he had fallen, would reproach his neighbour for having soiled his hands and clothing in doing so.

In trying to understand the reason for the number of the sacraments, we must keep in mind the reason for their being sensible things and words. It is by Divine institution that the sensible is so important. The history of the doctrines and errors concerning both the nature and number of the sacraments has shown that the errors were due mainly to a false, idealistic neglect of the sensible as a source of light for us in the understanding of the means God has chosen.

The sacraments are ordained to produce, increase and sustain in us the divine life. ~~Yet they are corporeal things~~ Since God has chosen these signs among corporeal things related to the life of our body, we may try to understand their number and kind by examining the fundamental function of our earthly life.

## Confirmation.

1. "In mortis periculo, juxta maxim" - babies at baptism.

Great danger soon to become normal. Atomic age. Of late discharges quickly piled in  
blues, not impossible there be a change. (Lured the man who compels a man to mine.)

We must first know of the importance of this sacrament.

Desire it - and ask for it.

No earthly welfare can compare with the good of confirmation.

2. Fortitude in defense of faith - from fulness of grace.

The analogy of combat and struggle should not mislead us - no more than the analogy of physical and spiritual maturity. It does not mean we must go out and defy people, and launch attacks. We must have charity above all. Be understanding. Especially sense of humour - humility. Never forget that beam in our own eye. No stones. But no compromise.

Particularly difficult for lay Catholics. Odium attached to a lay person who takes Catholic truth seriously in everyday life. This extends to Catholics amongst themselves. Much human respect to overcome.

Not all called upon to teach Catholic truth ex professo.

But all should know as much as circumstances allow. Especially those more particularly devoted to Catholic action. Knowledge - contemplation first.

Remember prayer over the people of last week Thursday.

Otherwise, reasons you give will turn out to be your own.

# Confirmation

1° Contra gentes IV 60.

(Materia) 2° III<sup>a</sup>, 72, 2, c.: "Balm is mixed with oil by reason of its fragrant odour, which spreads to others."  
Having ~~reached~~ come to perfect age, man begins to communicate his actions to others, whereas before, he lives, as it were, an individual life, for himself.

(Forma) 3° III<sup>a</sup> 72, 4, c.

Why complex form, ibid. ad 3.

(Character) 4° Differ. from baptism. ibid. 5, c. § 1<sup>m</sup>

(Effectus) 5° What grace conferred, ibid. 7, c. § 3<sup>m</sup>

6. Librum munitus, ibid. 8, o.

Bonum commune

Non tamen excellentia unius ad  
aliud - sed homini, ad seipsum,  
Sicut idem perfectus ut exaltat: primum.

"Signum distinctionum, quia discurrit  
ab aliis; configurationum, quia assimilat  
ei cuius tale signum est proprium." J. L.

# Manuscrite Bibliographie

- ① DUBLANCHY, E.: Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, T. IX, col. 2339.

"La maternité divine étant le principe de toutes les grandeurs de Marie, doit être le premier objet de notre étude. Pour en avoir un concept exact, nous devons l'étudier telle qu'il a plu à Dieu de la réaliser, c'est à dire, avec le privilège de la virginité intégralement conservée dans la conception et l'enfantement de Jésus."

La division de l'article est la suivante:

- I. La maternité
  - A. La Sainte Ecriture
  - B. La Tradition
- II. La Virginité
  - A. SS
  - B. Traditio
- III. Privilèges secondaires. etc.

- ② LEPICIER, A.M.: Tractatus de Beatissima Virgine Maria Matre Dei.

L'auteur ne donne pas la rapport entre le traité sur La Sainte Vierge et la Théologie, mais dans son "Proemium" il dit:

"Cum igitur theologi partes sint ea quae ad Deum spectant speciali studio prosecui, sub ea formali ratione qua divinae revelationis lumine nobis manifestata traduntur, hinc apparet nullo censu praetermitti debere tractationem de Beatissima Virgine Maria, utpote quam, Deo manifestante, novimus ad tam sublimen dignitatem fuisse elevatam, ut vere et proprie esset Unigeniti Filii Dei Mater. Nequit enim perfecte cognosci Filius, nisi cognoscatur et Mater, et vicissim omnis quae de Matre instituitur quaestio, ad Filium quadam ratione pertinet;...." (p. 1)

L'auteur divise son traité comme suit:

- De B.V. considerata per respectum Ad Deum
  - De iis quae praecedunt divinam maternitatem.
    - De Convenientia
    - De praedestinatione in Matrem Dei
    - De Vaticiniis
    - De Annuntiatione
  - De Divina Maternitate
  - De Consequentibus. (Dignitas, Officium, Relatio ad S. Trin.)
- De B.V. considerata per Respectum ad Seipsam.
  - De perfectionibus Animae (De Immac. Concep., non habuit fomitem, de impeccab., de la et 2a sanctificatione, de Virt.)
  - De Qualitatibus corporaibus
  - De Virginitate et Matrimonio
  - De Relationibus B. M. V. ad Homines. (Mater, Mediatrix, Corredemptrix)

③ C. Friethoff, O. P.: De Alma Socia Christi Mediatoris

Dans une introduction générale, l'auteur donne quelques remarques sur la notion de science, et de la Théologie, en disant que "Sacrae Doctrinae objectum cum sit scibile in credito, causa est et ratio quare theologia cum aliis scientiis in quibusdam concordare, in aliis vero ab illis discrepare videatur.... Commune ergo est omnibus scientiis non demonstrare suorum principiorum veritatem sed ea supponere.... Quamobrem "arumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium hujus doctrinae, eo quod principia hujus doctrinae per revelationem habentur..."

En parlant de "unus et mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Jésus", il pose quelques questions à propos de la médiation du Christ, et il ajoute: "Et tanto magis urgent responsiones, quanto firmitus quis inherere desiderat doctrinae de MARIA MEDIATRICE. Videntur enim prima facie perfecte incompatibilia, Christum esse unum mediatorem, et tamen Mariam esse mediatricem."

Après avoir traité de la notion de "mediator", il divise son ouvrage dans la manière suivante:

I. De Causa Universali Nostrae Salutis

1. De Socia Christi mediatoris.
2. " " " satisfaciens.
3. " " " merentis.
4. " " " redimentis.
5. " " " sacrificantis.
6. " " " triumphantis.

II. De Applicatione Causae Universalis. (De Distributione fructuum.)

1. De Socia Christi regnantis.
2. " " " interpellantis.

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④ BOVER, JOSEPH M., S.J.: Deiparae Virginis Consensus -- Corredemptionis ac Mediationis Fundamentum.

L'auteur commence son ouvrage avec ces mots: "Dolendum sane B. Virginis verba 'Fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum' (Lc. 1, 38) a recentioribus Lucae interpretibus iusto celerius expediri. Et tamen sub hisce verbis graves latent quaestiones, quas cursim praeterire non licet; quaestiones, inquam, ex quarum solutione pendet solutio gravissimi problematis de virginea corredemptione, quod hodie catholicos inter theologos tantopere agitur. Opportunum itaque fuerit eorum Virginis verborum sensum, quam accuratissime poterit, exquirere ac definire. Communibus hermeneuticae principiis ac normis utentes, litteralem ac realem eorum verborum significationem statuamus. Theologicas conclusiones, quae inde derivantur, in altero postmodum libro colligemus."



La division de l'ouvrage est la suivante:

- I. Documenta Consensionis virgineae
  1. Testimonium Lucae
  2. Traditionis testimonia (Ici l'auteur cite 110 auteurs -- des Peres, des Papes, des Docteurs, des orateurs, etc.)  
Il cite aussi les Liturgies.)
- II. Interpretatio Documentorum
  1. Theologicae notiones, documentorum interpretationi applicandae.
  2. Virgineae consensionis efficacitas salutaris generaliter concepta.
  3. Virgineae consensionis actio salutaris specificè considerata.
  4. Fundamentalìa principia, quibus salutifera virginis opera explicatur.

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5

PEGUES, O.P.: Commentaire de la Somme Théologique, Tome XVI

Après avoir donné l'ordre que donne St-Thomas à partir de Q.XXVII, l'auteur ajoute: "Remarquons seulement, toute de suite, que nous sommes ici, avec ces deux articles, au point précis où, dans la Somme Théologique, devrait se poser la question de L'Immaculée Conception." (p. 3).

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6

BILLUART: Summa S. Thomae, Tome VI, Diss. I, Intro.

Avant son commentaire sur IIIa, q. 27, l'auteur donne cette petite introduction: "Expendemus itaque primo ea quae pertinent ad ingressum ejus in mundum;.... Et quia beatissima ejus Mater pertinet ad ingressum ipsius in mundum, ideo sit ..... Diss. I etc."

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7

BILLOT, L., S.J.: De Verbo Incarnato -- Commentarius in Tertiam Partem.

L'auteur donne la même division que donne Saint Thomas depuis la question XXVII jusqu'à la question LIX inclusivement. Puis il dit: "Visum est praemittere huic disputationi generale quoddam compendium praerogativarum Virginis, prout luculenter elucet in ipso Scripturae postliminio, cum primum hominibus lapsis Salvator promittebatur. Tum postea, ad singula descendere quae tractat S. Thomas in praesenti:...."

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8

HUGON, E., O.P.: Tractatus de B. Virgine Deipara (in: Tractatus Dogmatici, Volumen alterum)

"Incarnatio attento praesenti Dei decreto. absque maternitate divina concipitur, ut ex dicendis plenius constabit. Quocirca

tractatum de Verbo Incarnato et Redemptore lōgice subsequitur et complet tractatus de Maria Deigenitrice. Sicut autem in Christologia id quod totum tractatum regit, est unio hypostatica, ex qua derivantur dotes gratiae et gloriae, ac diversa munia quae Christo competunt, ita in Mariologia id quod primum tenet est maternitas divina, quae radix et origo et causa est omnium gratiarum in B. Virgine ejusque officiorum erga homines ac demum officiorum nostrorum erga ipsam.

Quapropter tractatus praesens in his praecipuis contrahitur:

- I. De Meternitate divina.
- II. De sanctitate et gratiis B. V. M. Deiparae.
- III. De officiis B.M. Virginis Deiparae erga homines.
- IV. De cultu qui B. M. Virgini Deiparae debetur.

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⑨ MERKELBACH, B. H., O.P.: Mariologia: Tractatus de B. V. M. Matre Dei atque Deum inter et Homines Mediatrice.

"1. Mariologia est pars scientiae theologicae, ex principiis revelatis disserens de Matre Dei-Redemptoris qua tali, et de omnibus aliis ad eam pertinentibus. Dicitur:

1<sup>o</sup>, Pars scientiae theologicae. Scientia enim illa, quae agit de Deo, consequenter agit necessario de matre Dei, si quaedam sit; unde mariologia non est scientia ab omnibus aliis perfecte distincta, nam omnia quae ex principiis revelatis nota sunt, sub un ratione considerantur, in quantum sunt divinitus revelata, in ordine ad Deum.

6 2<sup>o</sup> Ex principiis revelatis disserens. De matre Dei, supernaturalibus utpote dignitate, missione ac privilegiis dotata, non habemus sufficientem cognitionem, nisi revelatione ipsius Dei. Pertinet ergo mariologia ad scientiam theologiam, quae principiis revelatis innititur et ex iis hauritur; et quidem ad tertiam partem theologiae, scil. ad doctrinam de Verbo Incarnato et Redemptore, cum qua intime connectitur et ad quam immediate sequitur. Hinc mariologia est pars organica Dogmaticae, ut videre est apud S. Thomam Sum. Th. III, q. 27, et seq.

3<sup>o</sup> De Matre Dei prae ceteris qua tali. Theologia enim omnia considerat in ordine ad Deum; hoc autem quod B. Virgo sit mater Dei, est relatio ad Deum ipsi Virgini propria et specifica, qua ab omnibus aliis distinguitur; porro dicitur Dei-Redemptoris, quia, in ordine praesenti, Deus Filius humanam naturam a matre non assumpsit, nisi in carne passibili et mortali ad nos redimendos. Hoc ergo quod Maria est mater Dei-Redemptoris, est ratio, fundamentum et radix omnium aliarum ejus ad Deum revelationem, et omnium ejus supernaturalium praerogativarum ac relationum ad nos:....

....tota doctrina mariana et omnia privilegia Mariae sufficienter indicantur sub hac praecise ratione qua in scientia sacra veniunt consideranda. Est ergo mariologia: scientia de matre Dei, et quidem in ordine praesenti, Dei-Redemptoris.

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12 KEUPPENS, I.: Mariologiae Compendium.

"I. Connexio Mariologiae cum tota Theologia.

1. Theologia, cum sit scientia fidei, merito dicitur a Deo doceri, Deum docere et ad Deum ducere. Ideo quaerendum est quomodo scientia mariologica has conditiones verificet:

1) A Deo docetur: quatenus in Scriptura, sed praesertim in Venerabili Traditione multae veritates circa Deiparam reconduntur.

2) Deum docet: Propter relationes inter Deum et B. V.

a) Relation creaturae ad Creatorem.....

b) B. V. toti Trinitati unitur propter relationes consanguinitatis et affinitatis,....

3) Ad Deum ducit: a.v. B. V. Maria etiam Deo jungitur, tamquam causae finali. Etenim sicut Christologia ad Theologiam pertinet, quia Christus est via ad Deum, ita et Mariologia, cum Maria non possit non esse via ad Christum et consequenter ad ipsum Deum."

\* \* \*

11 GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, R., O.P.: De Christo Salvatore (Commen in IIIam P.)

L'auteur divise le traité de L'Incarnation selon les divisions de Saint Thomas. Puis, il ajoute cette note: "Ad brevis procendendum in hac IIa parte, sub titilo De Mystério Redemptionis, tractabimus de Passione, etc..... Denique erit compendium Mariologiae." (p. 3)

Dans l'article I du "Compendium", il dit: "Ad hanc maternitatem divinam, prius praedestinata est B. Maria Vrigo et deinde per modum consequentiae ad plenitudinem gloriae et gratiae, ut sit digna Dei Mater. Hoc satis clare constat ex bulla Ineffabilis Deus....

Id est: aeternum Incarnationis decretum fertur, non circa Incarnationem quasi in abstracto, sed circa Incarnationem hic et nunc producendam seu velut individuatum, scil. circa Incarnationem Filii Dei ex Maria Virgine, ut dicitur in Symbolo Nicaeno-Constant.

Eodem igitur aeterno decreto Christus ut homo praedestinatus est ad Filiationem divinam naturalem, et B. Maria V. ad maternitatem divinam. Hoc autem decretum antecedit decretum praedestinationis hominum ex meritis Christi salvandorum, et cujuslibet aliarum personarum humanarum ad gloriam et gratiam. B. Maria V. igitur prius praedestinata est ad maternitatem divinam, tamquam ad quid principale, quam ad gloriam, sicut Christus prius praedestinatus est ad filiationem divinam naturalem, tamquam ad quid principale, quam ad gloriam, Id enim ad quod prius aliquis praedestinatur habet rationem finis et est quid altius quam alia ad quae deinde praedestinatur ille. Ex hoc jam apparet maternitatem divinam esse altiore plenitudine gloriae et gratiae, quae eam sequitur, ut B. Maria V. sit digna Dei Mater."

Division du traité:

- I. De eminenti dignitate Maternitatis divinae
- II. De Immaculata Conceptione
- III. Ab omni culpa actuali, etiam veniali praeservata est.
- IV. De perfectione initialis plenitudinis gratiae.
- V. De augmento gratiae.
- VI. De Finali plenitudine.
- VII. De Mediatione.

12 GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, R., O.P.: Mariologie: La Mère du Sauveur et Notre Vie Interieur.

Ici, l'auteur ne dit rien au sujet de la rapport entre la Mariologie et les autres parties de la Théologie. Dans ce livre se trouve le passage où Pere Garrigou-Lagrange se met en faveur de la théorie que Saint Thomas a affirmé le privilège de L'Immaculée Conception non seulement au debut de son carrière théologique (voir: I Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3) mais aussi à la fin de sa vie quand, après mûre reflexion, il est revenu à l'affirmation originale, (voir: Expositio super salutatione angelica,: "Ipsa enim purissima fuit et quantum ad culpam, quia nec originale, nec mortale, nec veniale peccatum incurrit.").

La division de cet ouvrage est semblable à celle du précédent.

\* \* \*

13 JANSSENS, L.: Tractatus De Deo-Homine -- sive De Verbo Incarnato.  
(Tome V)

Dans son prologue, l'auteur dit: "Iam in contemplandis mysteriis Christi pergamas, iuxta sequentia Symboli verba: 'Incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, etc.'" Ab ipsa enim mirabili conceptione Jesu de Virgine Matre exordimur expositionem, quae usque ad Christi triumphum pertingit....

At, ducibus simul Symbolo et Aquinate, in hac tractatione Matrem a Filio nullatenus sejungendam putamus. Unde Mariologiae alterum veluti secundarium huic volumini titulum addimus....

Etsi non uno loco, praecipue tamen de Beatissima Virgine dicemus in initio Sectionis primae, juxta ipsam indolem argumenti, et a d normam ordinis quem tenet Angelicus.

L'auteur divise le traité selon l'ordre des questions de la Somme.

\* \* \*

14 POHLE-PREUSS: Mariology.

Dans l'introduction, l'auteur dit: "Mariology is that part of Dogmatic Theology which treats of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the mother of our divine Redeemer.

Mariology is closely related to both Christology and Soteriology. Mary is truly 'Deipara' because Christ is truly Godman. As His mother she is the mother of our Redeemer, and thus intimately bound up with the atonement.

The chief prerogative of the Blessed Virgin Mary is her divine motherhood. From it flow all her other prerogatives. Hence, Mariology naturally falls into two main divisions: (1) the divine motherhood of Mary considered as the source of all her prerogatives, and (2) these prerogatives considered in themselves."

L'auteur parle de ces prerogatives dans l'ordre suivant:

1. Immaculate Conception; 2-Sinlessness; 3-Perpetual Virginity; 4-Assumption; 5-Mediatorship; 5-Cult of B.V.M.

15 TANQUEREY, AD.: Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae. (vol. 2)

Sous le titre "De Consectariis Utriusque Mysterii" (i.e., Incarnation et Redemption) l'auteur dit: "Post ea quae diximus circa Incarnationis et Redemptionis mysteria, remanet ut quaedam consecratoria ex hoc duplici mysterio fluentia exponamus: de cultu SS. Cordis Jesus; de B. Maria Virgine, matre Christi, tam intime ei connexa; necnon de Sanctis, qui cum eo regnant in caelo....

Expletis iis quae Christum spectant, ingratum non erit de ejus Matre agere, cum Ecclesia in sua liturgia Matrem a Filio non separet. Dicemus de B. Virgine 1<sup>o</sup> in se spectata (de maternitate, sanctitate, Assumptione, virginitate); 2<sup>o</sup> in suis relationibus cum hominibus (mater spiritualis, cooperatrix, regina, mediatrix universalis); 3<sup>o</sup> de devotione (erga purissimum Cor Mariae).

\* \* \*

16 Roschini, G. M., OSM: Compendium Mariologiae.

"Ratio Quaestionis. Scientia uniuscujusque rei a definitione proprii subjecti incipit. Videndum igitur est, ante omnia, quatenam sit definitio nominalis et quatenam definitio realis Mariologiae.

Attamen, animadvertendum statim est questionem de definitione Mariologiae subordinari necessario quaestioni de primo, ut aiunt, principio Mariologiae, cum hoc primum principium, in unaquaque scientia, ideam claram et plenam exhibeat objecti proprii scientiae de qua agitur, et in ipso, velut supra firmam petram, universa tractatio fundetur.....

C. Zimara...tenet possibile esse quod Mariologia aliquo supremo principio careat, et monet auctores ut ad hanc possibilitatem attendant, ad hoc ut excessus systematizationis vitentur. P. Bonnefoy, O. F. M., asserit varia tentamina ad primum aliquod Mariologiae principium stabiliendum vana esse, eo quod mariologia non est scientia quaedam sui iuris, neque scientia quaedam subalternata Theologiae aut Revelationis, sed est pars integrans Theologiae quae, prout declarat S. Thomas, est scientia una. Mariologia igitur non habet et non potest habere alia principia a principiis ipsius Theologiae diversa, quibus adiungendae erunt primae conclusiones ex ipsis deductae.

Dubitationes et negationes istae oriri videntur ex negatione indolis scientificae Mariologiae. Attamen, videtur hoc sustineri non posse. Mariologia enim, est utique pars integralis Theologiae (non vero scientia autonoma aut subalternata). Cum tamen Theologia sit vere propriaeque scientia, etiam Mariologia, quae est pars ejus integrans, vere propriaeque scientia dicenda est, et ideo, sicut quaelibet alia scientia, primum aliquod principium habere debet, quod essentiam ipsam proprii objecti exprimat. (p. 4-5)

...(p. 12) Definitio nominalis et realis Mariologiae.

Mariologia, iuxta vim nominis, nihil aliud est nisi sermo seu scientia de Maria, Matre Dei et Socia Mediatoris.

Realiter vero, Mariologia hoc modo definiri potest: Pars scientiae theologiae quae pertractat de Matre Dei et Socia Mediatoris.

Dicitur: 1) pars scientiae theologiae. Mariologia enim se habet ad Theologiam non sicut species ad genus, sed ut pars ad totum. Non enim secundum objectum formale quo (revelatio sive formalis sive virtualis), sed tantum secundum Objectum materiale Mariologia ab omnibus aliis theologicis scientiis discrepat....

juillet 1950 - International Student Seminar, France

Process  
Touch  
Sight

The idea of process 2 pp.

[Touch and sight] 2 pp.

The natural cursedness of things. 1 p.

~~autres~~ autres papers. 2 pp.

~~8~~

The idea of process.

Fundamental to modern thought since Nicholas of Cusa. (1401-64) Descartes. Leibniz. (1596-1650) (1646-1716) (1770-1835) (1818-93) Hegel. Marx. Engels. Einstein. Meyerson.

1. Quote entire.

Since, principle of contradiction involved.

Exclusion of middle:

This very radical. Ultimately, the "impossible" becomes principle of all femininity.

2. First, the mathematical idea of process. Straight-curve. Definition of elements in terms of limit:

What is the advantage? Greater precision. Calculus.

Gaps irrational. Why? (Answer later.)

3. Application to biology, evolution. Why this tendency?

" " Sociology. Genesis of society. Theory of evolution.

4. On basis of this idea, <sup>some</sup> philosophers make the following distinctions: I choose those who are not explicit:

Ensa : reason & intellect (constr. reason)

Legal: understanding and reason (contr. understanding)

Lyons-Engels: formal logic - dialectic (cont. dial.)  
(static) (dynamic)

Bergson: analysis of intuition. (see text, p. 443)

5. Is the process nautic or real?

The above told that it is real. (yet not so clear in Bergson)

difficulty: contradi. is that by which impossibility is defined.

Examples: mathematically false interpretation.

natural examples: cases of entrenchment & privation.

Meyerson: a tendency of reason - which, at the limit would destroy motion & thought.

In descent: tendency toward simultaneity of thought.

Weyl: Resolution in Divine Thought.

4. We accept this tendency: effort to overcome multiplicity of our means of knowing.

[Universaliz in Representation. (Ancients & Feuerbach)]

The dialectical tendency remains this side of reality:

(Question attempts to square the circle.)

Then Fairbank: ~~getting~~ gettingiweru. Authority SThomas.

We don't try to be end know.

{ to be and know. } it is indeed dialectical.  
{ univ. in fact. & univ. in representando. }

What we do in method of limits.  $2+2=4$ .

The kernel of Marxism: contradi. principle of all founding.

## Process toward a limit.

At the limit, it is said, straight & curve are identical. This involves a contradiction. But, it is said, thanks to contradiction, we have something radically new, and the logic of identity is superseded by a logic of contradiction.

This involves general diff.: { impossible & contradiction;  
infinitely small not = 0;  
corruption no contradiction.

## One solution.

Two problems of "one & many": { natural : object  
naetic : concept.

Our concepts for distinct representation as many as objects.  
Still another distinction we can point out by a reference to Feuerbach, which will lead us to Marx, who carries the philosophy of contradi. to its limit. [Feuerbach apparently unrelated - yet intimately]

"Gattungswesen" of man. F. reasons thus: To know is to be the known.

{ We are whatever we know.  
But we know ~~the~~ not only the human individual, but the universal ~~man~~ as well.  
Ergo.

Thanks to knowledge of the universal, we have full consciousness of self. It is because of this consciousness that we can know the species, the genus, in fact everything. Therefore, in the consciousness of the self we are faced with the infinite that is our self. (see last) God is man insofar as man has consciousness and feeling of his own unlimited nature. (p. vii)

Marx accepts this "critique" of religion. But does not stop at self-contemplation.

Man's being is a generic, a universal one, but this has meaning only when understood of his capacity of production which is universal. This creates self.

What has this universality to do with our problem of dialectical process?

We distinguish: two ways of being: ~~imitative~~ & intentional or objective.  
three kinds of universality { in singular (in re): predominant.  
from the singular (a re): in predic.  
toward the singular (ad rem): in represent. & causation.  
two kinds of one and many: natural & naetic.

If our knowledge ~~of~~ were universal in representation, we would know simultaneously and distinctly many things; why  $2+2=4$ ?

Self-knowledge would be first, and the light in which we would know all other things.

A universal means of knowing involves no contradiction, because the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower.

Recourse to process is a way of imitating a higher mode of knowing, but it remains an imperfect imitation. Straight he never knows by the concept of curve.

If the calculus did permit that, as Engels believed, <sup>it would</sup> we would indeed have undergone a radical change of nature - we would be, not just small minds attended by a huge intestine, but separated substances - that is, beings of an angelic nature. And then our battles would be not guns and bombs, but with lightning fleets of thought and blows of sheer will, from hatred or from love.



"Sometimes I have wondered whether Western culture turned into chimney smoke because of a neglected sense of touch." (Tomlinson, Gallions Read)

Fred Allen: risks of television.

- Quid: a culture that is too visual? Overemphasis characterise thought & action?
  - Sight, par excellence sense of representation, greatest variety, clarity, distinction: sense of knowledge
  - Touch, though poorer in representation, is sense of existence, of reality, of substance, of nature, of experience and of sympathy.
- Idea, our attitude towards tangible and visual will have counterpart in quality of our religious thought and sentiment; in our philosophy, science, fine arts, whole action, social, political.

Division of "sensible"

- per se { proper: colour, sound, etc. warm, cold; hard, soft. [Touch not one sense; also pain]
- common: number, magnitude, figure, mot, time... (Sight, mainly).
- per accid.

Quid "touch"? Exper. of "resisting chair"; ... position of body; wet, dry; etc. poorer in representation, coarseness; variable condition of subject: sensation of temperature, v.g. Not sense of clarity nor of distinction.

Sight: Most excellent; most objective, detached, precise. Most terms in which we discuss knowledge taken from sight.

Yet, such words as "object", "subject", "manifest", accord. to first impres., refer to touch.

Touch: Sense of certitude. Ex. of St. Thomas Aquinas. This experience familiar.

Prove fact of physical existence. Whereas words "ghost", "phantom" stand for virtual & intangible, as 'representations in dreams'.

Touch, in a sense, most inferior - but not less necessary.

- Sense of the animal; of food.

- Sense of intellect: no truth without certitude; truth, good of the intellect.

[Men disting. in mind according to quality of their touch].

- Sense of existence. (Pseudo, Expo...) First principles in realm of pure thought → philos. of spirit → terrestrial crudeness: only too tangible nihilism.

- Sense of substance: (not 'per se', but): feel within self, distinct from other. My hand mine. Other parts, however essential,...

- Sense of experience: familiarity; also, pain (without it, no sense of danger, no warning).

Idea, also sense of sympathy: "se mettre dans la peau d'autrui".

If other fellow mere "visual existence": cold, detached, objective view... danger of treating him accordingly. No sympathy with his life. Such 'objectivity' surely a useful quality in the Commissioner.

[Note, touch, in a special way, sense of the "other": feel with other].

- Sense of nature. We saw pain as warning against danger to our nature. But, more profoundly by touch we have a first intimation of qualitative innerness. When we feel "within ourselves", - this interiority not to be confused with that of place - as had in closed, which is visual; sight sense of off surface: to reach inside, e.g. inner transparency, i.e. invisibility.

Descartes denies Nature - and rightly so - for he has denied the reality of "proper sensible". This universe is a strictly mental one.

Clear, distinct ideas: external world of extension & modes of extension reduced to figure & mot.

No animals: automata, mechanisms; our body "buggy", steered about...

Excludes final causality, and hence "good". Touch 1<sup>o</sup> sense of good of animal.

Repudiation of touch felt in all fields of our culture.

"Physics" an "occasion". Why? Quantitative & provisional.

In Faith: representation without much verisimilitude.

Theology: opinion - all provisional.

Philosophy: residue of unsolved problems: merely to cultivate the mind.

Sculpture - even Michael Angelo. Separation from architecture. (Separation of soul & body; emancipation of furniture)

Painting - Rubens visual manes. No sense of gravitation.

Now, figures abstract. Much still expressed (think of Jean), but significant

Touch grows out of eye.

Music: essential appeal to visual. Does quality that stirs (invisibly) passions.

Poetry: compare with Shakespeare: requires tangible enunciation, must feel the words and their articulation in the mouth.

(Richard Church: "this is a numerous state of the art".

# The natural cursedness of things

in the intellectual order

Since things.

In first two lectures: how the usual interpretation of the idea of process implies an attempt to reject the very first of all principles - i.e. first truth, the nihilist implications of this: real contradiction becomes the principle of founding & replaces God.

In third: by rejecting relevance of touch, we deny a principle which is even more prior... leads to a monstrous objectivity. To a society defined exclusively in terms of structure - defn. of concentration camp, where everything is perfectly under control.

Now: on the natural cursedness of things.

Consider a man who has been taught that the sufficient reason of all things in this universe lies within the things themselves: that this is an intrinsically and wholly rational universe: a closed system with no reason beyond. If the man in question, Mortimer say, dares question the indoctrination to which he has been subjected, he may run into a few dangerous odds which we may gather under the general heading of 'The individual's condition of subject', or 'The things that also are', or 'The civilized man as <sup>the</sup> savage'.

In what is Mortimer a subject?

In the way he came to be. Here he is, and he had no choice in the matter.

Extraordinary improbability of his ~~existence~~ coming to be. He was, of course, possible - but most possibilities never come to be.

Just before conception he had about 1 chance out of a quarter trillion... Fortune... he did not choose to be the kind of fellow he is: the kind of body and, therefore the kind of mind. ~~Character~~ Appearance, character, degree of intelligence. Time, place. Nationality. Parents. Human environment - fellow pests. Social status.

Now that he exists here and now as such a fellow no definition could possibly encircle - what does he do? What is he to do and how. How must he eke out his mortal days.

His provisions are uncertain. He does not have the science of good and evil. His plans often upset. Has to choose mediocre ones. Not everyone is in the position of Macbeth to try reach for the throne of Scotland.

Plans thwarted, frustrated. Constantly exposed to get caught in a situation... <sup>Regularity of</sup> Fortune.

In fact, he may, at any moment cease to exist.

From this point of view, life a messy, messy universe. Especially in well-planned society (concentr. camp). How avoid the misfortune of such fortuitous society - no chance.

The System: { The general system. (Philosophy) } Spec. truth.

{ The practical system. (Ethics) }

Real problem: prudence: practical truth. Quid?

Right appreh.

Philosophical being of man.

Problem of existentialism.

To be & to be good.

'Closed society' - no chance.  
Bec. no humanity:  
The end of all.

Hegel & Marx

Spinoza

There is no general, ultimate, norm of conduct.

Cartesian clarity against the slings and arrows of  
outrageous fortune.

The same sun shines upon good & wicked alike.

The little bit of desire that makes all the  
difference.

To fear no death is a monstrous stake of man.

The idea of Incarnation. God amongst us.

The petty race.

Child.

1. Process and contradiction.

From Cusa to Bergson. — In Hegel & Marx, God replaced by founding of the  
the nihilism. Sacrifices for nothing. Monstrous indifference to immortality.

2. The emancipation of the visual.

All sight and no touch.

Mortal objectivity. No sense of existence, of sympathy, of interiority. Visual society.

3. Our condition of subject.

In becoming.

In action. Our providences are uncertain.

4. The idea of "System".

The historical being of man.

Impossibility of "deduction" from "man", or, from "this man".

Contingency. Not just freedom, but chance...

What to do? { Pure science  
Moral sc.  
Action & appetite.

Ex. of Soc. 271-...

## MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

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## Teleological Mechanisms

N. Wiener, W.S. McCulloch

The purpose of the articles by Wiener and McCulloch is to establish the possibility of understanding "purposeful" behavior in human beings in terms of control mechanisms found in instruments of communication. The general principle exemplified in such mechanisms is the control of effective input by the desired output. This control is established, first of all, by a closed circuit, or one in which there is the possibility of mutual influence of the input and output stages. Secondly, there must exist a "feedback", which is a transfer of power from the output stage to the input stage. The feedback will be negative, which means that it cuts down effective input. It will vary in intensity with the power received by the output stage. As input varies, so the feedback varies. By this means, the effective input, or that actually received by the section leading directly to the output, is stabilized, and the desired output achieved.

This principle is applied to man and his actions. Wiener writes: "Feedback is vital to all voluntary activity. When I pick up an object I never know what muscular contraction will effect my end. How do I regulate my motion and why does it succeed? In each stage, I regulate my motion by the amount by which my task is not yet accomplished. I monitor the extent to which I have completed my task in part visually, but also, to a con-



siderable extent, kinisthetically. There are, in each muscle, sensory end-organs like strain guages which report to the nervous system the stretch or rate of stretch to which the muscle is subjected." In this example offered by Wiener, the sensory end-organs would correspond to the output stage. Power is tapped off them and fed back to the nervous system, which would be the input stage. The nervous system then maintains, increases or decreases the power relayed to the muscles doing the work. Thus the desired output is effectuated.

Supplementing the notion of feedback taken from the field of communication is the factor of discrimination found in calculating instruments. Contingent upon the message received by the calculator, various circuits of the mechanism will be brought into operation. As applied to the human being, this factor of discrimination accounts for the versatility ~~in action~~ apparent in his action and lacking in simple instruments of communication.

In keeping with the similarities posited between the human being and the instruments of communication and calculation, the responses of the human being to external stimuli (to the messages received in its "coupling" with the world of perception) are held to be determined. Further, as in the case of the instruments, the rules of human action are, allowing for the original structure of the human organism, held to be imposed upon man from without, through the medium of sense experience. This will be seen shortly.

Of course, the apparent differences between such instruments and the human being are admitted. The most striking concerns freedom of action, seemingly manifest in the case of man and utterly

lacking in the case of the machine. On this score, Wiener writes: "The artificial machine is generally presented to us with all the rules of its operation explicitly stated, whereas the machine of the human being is very greatly conditioned by its own past experience and is known to us only as a class of machines rather than as a certain specific machine. It may seem, therefore, that logical theory leaves the human machine freer than the artificial machine, so that while the artificial machine has one fixed logic of its own, man may wander through all logics. I think this view is false. The human machine in any particular case and in any particular situation, has a determined logic, but we do not know precisely what it is."

Wiener makes mention of the conditioning of present behavior by past experience. Here, we have a second extremely important difference between the human being and the machine. The principles of human behavior (the "logics" of Wiener) vary, but those of the machine do not. The process involving change of principles is learning, and it is limited to man. In connection with the relation between the variety of the principles of behavior and freedom of action, an analysis of the process of learning is necessary. Wiener limited himself to the expression of disbelief in the legitimacy of the leap from learning to freedom. McCulloch offers an interesting hypothesis in support of this disbelief.

McCulloch writes: "Now let us turn back to Cajal's theory of learning and suppose that, in the growing nervous system, cells used together become associated in structure. In our initially somewhat chaotic nervous system, almost everything might be con-

nected to almost everything else, clearly, there must be competition between nervous cells for footspace on their followers. There, at least, priority in time might determine which would succeed and be perpetuated, but it is to be faced that this is not enough. Confronted with a new problem, behavior may be initially random, but once success is achieved, the successful mode of behavior becomes the preferred mode, and ultimately the fixed mode, of behavior. This, in substance, is Thorndyke's law of effect. The question is simply how this can be accounted for in terms of what would fix the connections of cells. Must we invoke impulses from some remote structure whose activity corresponds to its sense of satisfaction, or can we look locally to the relations of one cell to another. I believe the latter is the case, although as yet I see no way to prove it. We will invoke what may be called a setting-in process. It will be recalled that, if an external magnetic field is applied to a lump of iron, the little magnets scattered within in are compelled to assume new positions and, if they are subjected to a series of such forces, the strength and duration of these forces will, to a certain extent, determine their organization. The most significant thing by far will, however, be that force which lasttput a given magnet into position before the force disappeared. Our setting-in process is similar to this. The activity itself disappears when the problem is solved, and it leaves the cells to continued growing along the last pattern enforced by the activity."

Thus the impress of an activity determined by the logic of the situation and the logic of the human machine remains, and

the machine is left to respond to a related situation in a somewhat diverse but equally determined fashion. Perhaps, by a happy development in the growth of the cells, new ideas may arise and, by a repetition of the "setting-in" process, lead to endless progeny.

De Trin. q. 2, q. 4.

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De Trin. pp a - b

1957-58.

Q. 43 - Missions

Q. 29 à 38. → 14 pp manuscrites

Plan of the Treatise De Trinitate - 2 pp. mimeog.

There is a capital distinction to be made between 'logical form' and 'artificial form.' The former was possibly one of the nuances of 'logos.'

To point out this distinction we may refer to St. Paul's definition of Faith in Hebr. xi, 1. It makes one wonder, for it appears to be a bad definition, but it is not: *substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium*. "Now Faith is a quality, not a substance, and should be rather considered, defined, as an habitus, a virtus; moreover argumentum refers rather to reason. But St. Thomas explains, in de Verit., q. 14, a. 2: "Videtur autem potius esse dicendum quod haec fidei notificatio sit completissima ejus definitio: non ita quod sit secundum debitam formam definitionis tradita, sed quia in ea ~~sufficiens~~ sufficienter ~~tanguntur~~ tanguntur omnia quae exiguntur ad fidei definitionem. Quandoque enim ~~ipsis~~ ipsis philosophis sufficit tangere principia syllogismorum et definitionum, quibus habitis, non est difficile in forma<sup>s</sup> reducere secundum artis doctrinam..." In other words, that definition lacks only something purely 'accidental.' The artificial form ~~merely~~ merely explicates what is contained in the definition.

In IIa IIae, q. 4, a. 1, c., St. Thomas says about that same definition of faith: "licet quidam dicant praedicta Apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem, tamen, si quis recte consideret, omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in praedicta descriptione tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis: sicut etiam apud philosophos

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praetermissa syllogistica forma syllogismorum principia tanguntur."

St. Thomas himself, following Aristotle, will often put the minor premiss of a syllogism before the major premiss. He could, in such a case, convert it into an artificial form, that is, put it in an order that is really 'accidental.' Still, though he does not do this, he retains a logical form, but one that differs from the artificial form. In Ad Hebraeos, c.11.lect.1, he remarks: "Definitionem fidei ponit complete quidem, sed obscure."

Next we may oppose artifacts such as words and tables, to the work whose form is properly logical. This 'opus' differs almost beyond recognition from the former cases.

It is at this stage that we are faced with the familiar distinction between grammar and logic. Both are concerned with the word, yet from totally distinct angles. Grammar considers the word inasmuch as it flows from man's practical intellect, viz. qua artificial sign. (Cf. de Verit., q.4, a.1) This is the formal subject of grammar. Hence it is that grammatical definitions should be constructed in terms of 'art,' for the mode of defining depends on the very subject. Grammar will not define the word qua sign. It will say that the noun, for instance, signifies per modum substantiae: for though 'colour' does not signify a substance, it signifies colour in the mode of a substance; similarly the adjective is what signifies per modum accidentis, namely for the grammarian. But to the logician, 'rational', though grammatically an adjective, signifies essential, intrinsic, difference of the very substance itself.

Now, words signify concepts, which is the reason logic is concerned with words. For there is an "ordo quem ratio

facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae." (In I Eth&cor., lect. 1, n. 2) Accordingly logic needs those artificial, external forms: words and then their exterior disposition, as it were.

At this juncture we are faced with a danger, and this is to ~~resolve~~ resolve into artificial forms in the way the grammarian does, such as to be satisfied with a certain spacial disposition, such as figures, modes, etc. These ~~artificial~~ <sup>of grammar</sup> forms/are meant to dispose us with a view to the properly logical form; whereas the resolution that is proper to logic is one that bears upon, or rather analyses, ~~ex~~ divides or reduces to logical intentions, and not to the purely artificial form. The logician should be able to perceive within the order of words an order that does not concern the grammarian and that rightly escapes him: this order is invisible to grammar <sup>ar</sup> because far more intelligible. Thus St. Thomas says that ~~quaedam invisibilia sunt~~ "quaedam invisibilia sunt, quorum quidditas et natura perfecte exprimitur ex quidditatibus rerum sensibilium notis, et de talibus intelligibilibus possumus scire quid est, sed mediate, sicut ex hoc quod scitur quid est homo et quid est animal, sufficienter innotescit habitus unius ad alterum, et ex hoc scitur quid est genus et quid est species." (De ~~Trin.~~ Trin., q. 6, a. 3; or lect. ii, ii, a. 3 ??) These 'intelligibilia' or 'invisibilia' are ~~of~~ of course second intentions.

Referring now to the distinctions made in De Trin., q. 6, a. 2, we start "ex apprehensione sensus. Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter (meaning: it is not always the same): quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque in solo intellectu." It is this latter term that logic shares with metaphysics. Hence, to 'judge' according to sense or



imagination in logic is all wrong. "Deduci autem ad aliquid est ad aliud terminare", and error would ensue if we were to "deducere ad sensum" in logic, as we should do in philosophy of nature.

Similarly there is a danger ~~of "deducere ad sensum"~~ ~~in logic~~ of "deduci ad formam artificialem" in logic, that is, to judge according to the external form. In this case the definition of Faith given by St. Paul would be misjudged: we ~~it~~ would betray a wrong understanding of that intentional thing: definition. The danger is very real since the two forms, artificial and logical, are in fact closely intertwined. So long as our minds have not surmounted that peril by dint of a certain type of abstraction that makes logic so difficult, so long as we have not learned to deduce into logical intentions, we are unable to understand what logic is about and how it proceeds.

Nor should we ever resort to "deduci ad ipsum nomen." There are examples of this confusion in the case of relative names (Vd. Ia, q. 13, a. 7), in that of the word 'genus'. These must be viewed in their contexts. Genus is seen as a predicable in the Isagoge and as a predicate in the ~~Topics~~ Topics, and these are different second intentions. <sup>Also,</sup> The word 'subject' in the Perihermeneias, which is there sometimes considered in relation to predicate, sometimes in relation to propria passio; then again in the Priora. In other words, different acts of reason offer totally distinct second intentions, so that knowledge of these requires knowledge of those.

Two important texts relating to this subject are: Meta. V, lect. 7, n. 848; and Ia, q. 16, a. 6. (Cajetan all wrong here).

Logic apparently participates in the three modes

of De Trin., q. 6, a. 3, though principally in that of "etaph.:  
'intelligibiliter.' Logic always goes to the 'quid' and it  
enjoys more certitude than metaphysics insofar as it possible  
to reach, in logic, such a quid. More certitude too than  
philosophy of nature because the second intention is something  
necessary and immutable. It further participates in the mode  
of philosophy of nature inasmuch as the second intentions  
can be reached only via those sensible signs, words. But these  
are only principles, not terms!

1. Cum de Trinitate loquimur, cum cautela et modestia est agendum. (Ia, 31, 2, c.) De analogia in phil. et in S. Doctrina.
2. Tractatus in tres partes dividitur:

I. De iis quae se habent ut praecognita et praesupposita ad distinctionem personarum. QQ. 27 & 28.

- (a) De processionebus tamquam fundamenta relationum ad intra, in quibus Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur. (Q. 27)

Primo, de processione quae in Deo inveniri potest, scil. secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod verbum manet in agente. (a. 1. - Cf. In Joann. i; C. G. IV, 11)

Secundo, de processione quae est generatio in quarto modo dicendi per se. (Generatio ut nativitas, quae primo ~~modum~~ natura. Inde foecunditas.) (a. 2.)

*dicatur.*

Tertio, alia processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, ~~xxxxxx~~ prius similitudine et pondere, deinde ut possumus per modum inhaesionis appetitus in bono. Et ad istam terminatur processio ad intra secundum intelligibilem emanationem. (a. 3)

Quarto: processio amoris non est generatio, quia non completur in ipsa similitudine, quae se habent per modum principii processionis quae est per modum impulsionis et implentis. (Non habet speciale nomen. Tamen 'Spiratio' -- "tamquam advenientis spiritus vehementis.") (a. 4)

Quinto: Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur uno verbo et uno amore -- secundum duas operationes immanentes, quae solae Deo convenire possunt.

3x

- (b) De ipsis relationibus divinis, quae secundum processiones accipiuntur, et reales sunt. Q. 28.

Primo: 'Relatio' diversimode accipitur, et est terminus analogus. Relationes quae fundantur in processionebus ipsae reales sunt. (a. 1)

N.B. Sunt quatuor oppositiones. Sola oppositio relatio in Deo salvari potest, eo quod termini ejus non tollunt aliquid per modum negationis -- ut jam patet in relationibus paternitatis et filiationis. Et quia talis oppositio non facit divisionem in esse sed in respectu, in Deo inveniri potest. (a. 2)

*Tertio* Secundo: *relatio in his, idem est cum sua essentia, eo modo quo, proportionaliter, actio 4, idem cum motu*  
et sunt reales et distinctae, quia quamvis non fundentur super extrema, secundum se distinctae, sed super illud quod distinctionem facit, scil. origo ~~et~~ seu processio, quae extrema et respectus producit. Origo autem est communicativa naturae, non divisiva.

(N.B. A.v., in God, there can be distinct terms prior to the relations, between which terms the relation would occur. For whatever, in God, precedes relationship, is absolute, not distinct, and wholly one. Hence it is

that only procession and origination can found  
real relations that do not require extremes distinct  
and prior to these relations, whereas these in fact  
give rise to the extremes that are found in God.  
(The relations, in effect, are substantial, not accidental).  
(a.3)

Quarto: there are four such relations in God.

## II. De Ipsis Personis secundum se.

(a) Id quod est commune omnibus personis.

Primo: quid sit persona. (Q.29)

Secundo: divisio seu pluralitas Personarum (q.30).

Tertio: ea quae pluralitatem consequuntur et  
quomodo circa istam nominibus utendum (q.31). <sup>sit</sup>

Quarto: cognoscibilitas Personarum, et consequenter  
earum nominatio et discretio, quod fit per  
notiones (q.32).

(b) De singulis Personis.

Primo: de Persona Patris (q.33).

Secundo: de Persona Filii quantum ad rationem et  
munus Verbi (q.34).

Tertio: de Filio ut Imago (q.35).

Quarto: De Persona Spiritus Sancti quantum ad rationem

Quinto: tum sumendo 'spiritum' ut dicit impulsus  
et efficaciam voluntatis procedentem a Patre  
et Filio spirantibus; tum ut dilectio seu amor  
Spiritus (q.37).

Sexto: de S. Spiritu in quantum est donum procedens et  
emissum a donante (q.38).

## III. Quinque comparationes Personarum.

Primo: in ordine ad essentiam quae illis terminatur,  
et ad nomina essentialia quibus significatur (q.39).

Secundo: Comparantur Personae ad relationes, quibus  
ut formis personalibus constituuntur Personae (q.40).

Tertio: comparantur ad actus notionales secundum quos  
originantur Personae, vel produciunt (q.41).

Quarto: Comparantur Personae inter se quantum ad  
aequalitatem, magnitudinem, coaeternitatem et  
similia (q.42).

Quinto, comparantur quoad creaturas ad quas mittuntur  
Personae pro opere aliquo sanctificationis, in  
quo, vel visibiliter apparent personae, vel invisibiliter  
habitant in anima per sanctificationem (q.43).

## Q. 43. Missions

art. 5. To be invisibly sent pertains ~~not~~ to the Son, and not just to the Holy Spirit: He dwells in the soul, which enjoys Him, and attains this effect and term as He proceeds from the Father. This is, essentially, 'to be sent' or a mission. The Father dwells in the soul but is not sent, for He is not from another.

Some gifts are attributed to the Son as to their proper nature, by way of an appropriation, namely such as belong to the understanding.

Read ad 2<sup>m</sup> on the various kinds of assimilation to the Div. Persons.

Ad 3: looking at the missions on the part of their effects, we distinguish them as illumination of the understanding and the rousing (inflammation) of affection.

Art. 6. The Div. <sup>invisible</sup> missions extend to all who are in grace, inasmuch as the Div. Persons rest in them in a new way, and proceed <sup>thence</sup> to them. We say 'in a novel way' because the Div. Persons were already there. --- Note: the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost was preceded by His invisible mission even in the Fathers of the Old Testament. The intimacy of the presence corresponds to the perfection of grace. (E.g. St Stephen).

Notice last sentence of ad 4: The divine persons are not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the instrumental causes that are the sacraments.

art. 7: The Holy Spirit is not only sent invisibly but also visibly.

The nature of man is such that he is led to the invisible by way of the visible things. Now God provides for things according to their nature. Ideo, the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by visible things. He does not manifest them for themselves, but those by means of these.

This was already done by pointing out visible fatherhood and filiation and breath. The persons too are referred to by visible things: The Son is sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Spirit as the sign of sanctification.

Read ad 1<sup>m</sup>

Ad 2<sup>m</sup>: The Holy Spirit was sent visibly inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs specially designed for that purpose.

Q. 29, a. 1 (Sequentia)

ad 1. The singular cannot be defined, but what it is to be a singular is definable. Hence 'what a primary substance is'. Hence 'contingency' and 'motion'.

ad 2. Substance taken 'communiter', analogical to the verifiable of primary and second. By adding 'individuum', contracted to stand for primary. (Notice, 'primary' also analogical.)

ad 3. The names of intentions can be used of real things (in lieu of the names of real things) when these have not been named. We thus change the imposition deliberately. Case of 'individuum' as opposed to 'universal'.

ad 4. Nature has many meanings. One of them is 'what a thing is' or 'essence'. Then, why not 'essence'? This from 'esse', which is communisimum. 'Nature' refers to the proper form of a thing. Person being an individual of a special kind, 'nature' was preferred.

ad 5. The soul is not an individual substance, but an individuated part of a substance, even as a hand. Hence, neither the definition of person nor the name person can be said of the soul.

Notice implication of 'individual'. Only individuals exist, and are taken here as incommunicable. (Explan. later.)

Q. 29, a. 2: Whether the person is the same as the hypostasis, the subsistence, and the essence.

'Substance' said in two ways:

(a) of 'what the thing is', i.e. what is signif. by the definition.  
In Greek 'οὐσία'; Latin 'essentia'.

(b) of 'subject' or 'supposit' which subsists in the genus substance.

Now this can be named by the name that signifies the 'intention': last subject in predication.

But, 'supposit' also has three other names which signify, not the intention, but the thing (res):

(i) res naturalis

(ii) subsistentia

(iii) hypostasis.

Inasmuch as it exists in itself and not in another,

(the supposit is called 'substance' (i);

- as subjected (logically) to a common nature,

'res naturalis', such as this man (i);

- as subjected to accidents, hypostasis or substance (iii)

Now, what these three names signify commonly is intended by the name 'person' in the case of rational substances.

'Hypostasis' and 'person' add to 'essence' by contracting it to this.

Materia et principium substantiae; forma substantiae.



Q. 29, a. 3. Whether the name 'person' can be used in diminutives.

'The subsistent in a rational nature' & person in tota natura.

Hence applies to God. But not as it does in the case of creatures.

Hence new imposition: analogical term.

Not a metaphor. (ad 2)

Distinguish id a quo from id ad quod the name ~~is~~ hypothesis  
is imposed. (3<sup>m</sup>)

How 'ratio' is said of God; 'individuum'; 'substantia'.

Q. 29, a. 4 Whether the name 'person' signifies a 'relation'.

diff.: person signifies something absolute. But the div.

Persons are subsistent relations. Hence the name extended  
to mean both the divine essence and the relation.

(But this cannot be verified of created person - may  
be related, but not relation.)

Q. 30. de pluralitate personarum.

(1) Whether they are many.

There are several subsistent relations in God. These are really distinct according to the processions.

Hence there are several subsistents in God, and these are really distinct. Hence several persons.

(2) Only three Persons.

There are only three properties or relations opposed one to the other, nl. paterity, filiation, which are reciprocally opposed; Spiration, active and passive, which are also opposed. But the active spiration is opposed neither to paterity nor to filiation, because it neither proceeds from them nor do they proceed from it. Therefore, active spiration is identical with paterity and filiation. But passive spiration is opposed to paterity and filiation: (a) because it proceeds from the spiration which is identical with paterity and filiation, and is thus opposed to them as "spirants"; (b) and because if passive spiration were identical with paterity and filiation, both would be said to be 'spirated' and to proceed by way of love. Besides, if they ~~identified~~ identified the active spiration with themselves, if they appropriated it, they would severally proceed from themselves.

Concl.: Only three relations constitute opposite relations, and therefore personal properties, whereas active spiration is not a property, being common to Father and Son.

(3) The numeral terms signify only three ones, i.e. three things, each of which is one, i.e. undivided. Transcending multiplicity (*ens unum & multa*), not predicamental.

- 5
- (4) Person common according to community of predication, but as 'individuum vagum', as in 'a man'?

Q. 31: of the unity and plurality which belong to divine things.

- (1) The name 'Trinity' is said of God, but not of each person severally. For it signifies a plurality of three.
- (2) The Father is 'other' than the Son, but not 'something else'. The latter refers to the nature, which in God is one and the same. And it is with all names that would imply plurality of nature. Notice the difference between the question 'Who is he', e.g. 'Socrates'; and 'what is he?' e.g. 'a rational animal.'
- (3) If 'alone' means 'solitary,' not to be used of the divine Persons. But if used, not to exclude the communication between the Persons, but to exclude from them the creatures, then... as in 'God alone is eternal.'
- (4) If we say 'The Father alone is God,' if this is to be true, it must be construed to mean: "He who alone is called the Father, is God."

Qu. 32: Whether the Trinity of the div. Persons  
can be known by natural reason.

7

a.1: God known from creatures. Creation common to div. Persons.  
Hence Trinity remains hidden.

Contrary to dignity of faith.

Contrary truth in conveying truth of faith: *inimic infidelium*.

The best we can do for those who do not believe is to show  
that what we believe is not impossible.

a.2. Whether we should print notions in God.

(i.e. apply names that signify by way of form)

~~xxx~~ We signify divine simplicity by abstract names, e.g. deity, wisdom;  
but with reference to substance, concrete names, e.g. Deus, or Wise.

(a) Impersonal names: Paternity and Pater.

Here we have forced us to ~~make~~ abstract notions; to  
point out 'that by reason of which' the Persons are distinguished.  
Such are the properties or notions signifying in the abstract,  
e.g. paternity, ~~and~~ filiation, procession.

Essence is signified as what;

Person as Who;

Property as 'by which' i.e. by reason of which.

(b) The Person of the Father is related to two Persons,  
to that of the <sup>son</sup> and to that of the Holy Spirit, but not  
by one relation but by two. Otherwise Son and  
Spirit would be referred to the Father by a single  
relation. Seeing that only relation multiplies  
the Trinity, Son & Spirit would not be two Persons.  
Hence it is that we must understand a twofold  
relation in the Father, by which he is referred to Son & Spirit.  
But since the Father is but one Person, we have to  
signify the ~~two~~ two relations in the abstract - and  
this is what we mean by properties or notions (Augustin, de Tr.  
~~These signify~~ The abstract terms signify relations (not things  
or 'res'), by means of which the Persons are known, while the  
notions or relations are really in God.  
NB We cannot say The Fatherhood generates, but will 'the Father generates

These are modes of  
signifying; they do  
not imply real diversity  
on the part of what  
is signified. E.g. deitas  
and Deus.

Q. 32, a. 3: Whether there are five notions.

8

The div. Persons are multiplied by origin. This implies an a quo alius and a qui ab alio. The Father cannot be known as 'from another,' but as 'from no other.' His notion is therefore 'innascibility,' i.e. he cannot be born.

①

But inasmuch as someone is originally from Him, he can be known in two ways: inasmuch as the Son is from him, he is known by the notion of paternity; inasmuch as the Spirit is from him, he is known by the notion of common spiration.

②

③

④

The Son's notion is 'filiation.' But inasmuch as the Spirit is from the Son too, he is known in the way the Father is, i.e. by the notion of common spiration.

⑤

The Holy Spirit is made known as ab alio or ab aliis, by the notion 'procession'.

Only two of these are relations, for innascibility is not a relation (except by reduction).

There are only four properties, for 'common spiration' is not a property, belonging, as it does, to two Persons.

Only three are personal notions, i.e. constituting Persons: paternity, filiation, procession. [Common spiration and innasc. are notions of persons, not personal notions.]

The notions as such are not things, but make things known in an abstract way. Ideo, we cannot say the God is fivefold. Nor do innascibility and paternity refer to real distinctions - for they are not relatively opposed.

a. 4. Pars.

Q. 33. On the Person of the Father.

9

1. The Father is 'Principle', absolutely.  
definition of principle. [Quid 'first' principle]  
Note distinction { a quo : priority  
ad quod : origin.

2. Whether 'Father' is the proper name of a divine Person.

The Father is disting. from the other persons by His Paternity.

In us, 'father' does not signify the person but the relation of the person. But in God, the relation signified by 'father' is a person, i.e. a 'subsistent person'.

Why not Genitor? (Genitori genitorum). Father is named after the perfection and term. Generation signifies "ut in fine".

3. Is 'Father', as applied to God, said proprie as a personal name.  
For God is also called 'Father' commonly, and the common is called 'pater', at least as to knowing. He is also called 'Pater Noster'.

God the Father has the fulness of Paternity ----  
With respect to creatures not so full, because of the lack of similitude. He is called Father of the creature because of some resemblance in them to God; but never 'perfecta ratio'. But similitudo duplex:

Our paternity only  
a reshpe

> - vestigi  
- imitatio } creationis  
                  } gratiae (adoptive sons)  
                  } gloriae

4. Is it proper to the Father to be Unbegotten?

As a principle that is not from a principle, He is made known as 'who is not from another', which belongs to the property or notion of immutability, named by 'unbegotten'. Father unbegotten begetting. This signified by negation in the order of signification.

## i. Whether 'Word' in God is a personal name.

Personal, not essential in any way.

Word, in us, said properly in three ways:

(a) more manifestly: the spoken word, nl. 'voiced'?

But this proceeds from within us to two things found in the spoken word: (1) the vocal sound itself, and (2) the meaning of this sound. (A vocal sound that does not signify is not a word.)

Hence it is that the vocal sound proceeds from its meaning or representation. Av., the external word or vocal sound is called a word because it signifies an internal conception of the mind.

id in quo  
intellectus  
intelligit.

(d) Unde, firstly and chiefly, the word 'word' is said of the interior concept of the mind, which <sup>proceeds</sup> from and remains within the mind.

(β) the vocal sound that signifies the concept;

quo  
quod }

(γ) the representation of the vocal sound is called a word.

There is a fourth way, nl. a figurative one, nl. "that which is signified by the word or effected by it, such as a deed or command, of the one who enunciates or commands.

'Word' is taken strictly in God as signifying the concept of the intellect. Now, it is essential to the word thus taken that it proceed from something other than itself, nl. from the knowledge of the one who conceives it.

Hence it is that the term 'Word' as we use it of God, signifies something that proceeds from another; which pertains, ~~to~~ in God, to personal names, inasmuch as the divine Persons are distinguished by origin.

11  
The word is not the same as the very act of knowing, but the name 'Word' refers ~~to~~ to that which the intellect conceives in knowing. We can say that the word is knowledge (*notitia*) but it should then not be understood of the act of knowing. This is conveyed by Augustine's expression '*Verbum ad sapientiam genita*' begotten wisdom, or begotten knowledge.

Dicere, to speak, is also proper to the Word, personally. But 'to be spoken', dici, pertains to each person, for not only is the word spoken, but also that which is understood by the word or signified. A.V. to be spoken in the way the Word is spoken is proper to one person; but if 'to be spoken' refers to what is understood in the word, then common. See 4<sup>th</sup>, a. 1, ad 3 "*Pater enim intelligendo se....*"

2. 'Word' proper name of Son (as distinguished from the other persons)?

Since the word signifies an emanation, a coming forth from intellect, and Son proceeds in this way, while this procession is called the generation of the Son, 'Word' can be said of the Son only.

'Word' and 'Son', as said of God, refer to the same property; the 'birth' of the Son in God, which is a personal property is signified by many other names, each helping us to express diversely this perfection. See 4<sup>th</sup>, ad.

3. Whether the name 'Word' implies a relation to the creature?

See corpus. Add: Word represents His own humanity and temporal life, not only by expressing it ~~temporally~~ cognitively within God, but also as operative - per quem Omnia facta sunt. Item His Mother. And, inasmuch as the Blessed see God in the Word, the Blessed V. sees God in the word to Whom she gave birth temporally, the same ~~that~~ Whom the Father generates eternally. Hence Union Union.

dicere  
dici



Q. 35. Of the Image.

12

1. Whether Image in God is said personally.

Similitude is of the nature of image.

But Similitude of species is according to sign of species.

(in corporeal things chiefly <sup>but colour</sup> *figura* - *proximum signum speciei*.)

Similitude not enough: origin. The egg not image of another, because ~~it~~ one is not derived from the other. *Processus*.

Nw, whatever implies procession or origin in God belongs to divine persons, i.e. is personal.

Non posterioritas, sed assimilatio.

2. Whether the name 'image' is proper to the Son?

The Holy Spirit, although he receives the nature of the Father even as the Son receives it, nevertheless he is not said to be ~~of~~ born; likewise, although he receives the likeness of the Father, he is not called the Image - for ~~not~~ love is not fulfilled in the image, as we saw.

Image ~~2~~er { *figura* in his son  
*king* in coin: we thus: *ad imaginem*

## Q. 36. On the Person of the Holy Spirit.

### 1. Special difficulty in naming the Holy Spirit.

Namely, two reasons for this name:

(a) It is in a sense common: as *id a quo*.

(b) Imposed on the Person as proper, because 'spirit' means breath, wind blast, motion, and love does move and impels the will of the one who loves toward the loved: 'impelling power.' Sanctity is said of the things that are ordered to God. Now, this Person proceeds by way of love, by which ~~the~~ God is loved. Hence... But the naming is ex usu Ecclesiae.

### 2. Whether He proceeds from the Son

Not only from Father but also from Son:

(a) because He is to be distinguished from the Son, hence relatively opposed to Son; such a rel. opposition is had in ~~relation~~ virtue of origination and procession, and, since the ~~Spirit~~ <sup>Son</sup> does not proceed from the ~~Spirit~~ <sup>Son</sup>, the Spirit must proceed from the Son. Must be a formal order between them.

(b) It is of the nature of love to proceed from the word or conception of the mind: *nil a matrem in intellectu*.

### 3. A Patre per Filium - through the Son.

Yes, for although the power of spiration in both Father and Son, these powers are distinct; but the Son has it from the Father.

### 4. Father & Son One principle of the Holy Spirit. For 'principle' is taken substantively, and in this Father and Son are not opposed, because they are one 'spirator' (noun), though two 'spirantes' (adjective).

Predic. in one of three ways: leading to

I. subst.

II quant., qual., relation. :

III passion, action, when, where, situs. habitus.

Q. 37. On the H. S.'s name 'love.'

14

1. Whether it is a proper name.

Taken essentially, for the simple of lover to loved, not proper. But if taken notionally for the relatedness to principle whence it proceeds by way of spiration, then personal and proper to H. S. who proceeds by way of love.

2. Whether F. & S. love each other by the Holy Spirit.

If 'to love' taken essentially, not notionally, then no.

But if notionally, to love means the same as 'to spirate love' (from forth? Emit?) - just as 'to speak' is to produce a word, and 'to flower' is to produce flowers. So does the Father speak himself by the Word or Son, and so do ~~also~~ the Father and Son love each other and us, by the Holy Spirit, i.e. by the love that proceeds as a Person.

Q. 38. The name of the Holy Spirit, which is 'Gift.'

1. If meant to signify the Holy Spirit is the gift proceeding from the giver, then personal: quia relatio processionis.

2. Cf. text of S. Thomas.

Concl. The Holy Spirit is the first and uncreated ~~person~~ grace or ~~own~~ gratuitous will of God.

NB. Q. 41, a 1, ad 2<sup>m</sup>, on naming in the order of Trinity.

PLAN OF THE TREATISE  
DE TRINITATE

1. Cum de Trinitate loquimur, cum cautela et modestia est agendum. (Ia, 31, 2, c.) De analogia in phil. et in S. Doctrina.

2. Tractatus in tres partes dividitur:

I. De iis quae se habent ut praecognita et praesupposita ad distinctionem personarum. QQ. 27 & 28.

(a) De processionibus tamquam fundamenta relationum ad intra, in quibus Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur. (Q. 27)

Primo, de processione quae in Deo inveniri potest, scil. secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod verbum manet in agente. (a. 1. -- Cf. In Joann. I; C. G. IV, 11)

Secundo, de processione quae est generatio in quarto modo dicendi per se. (Generatio ut nativitas, quae primo natura dicitur. Inde foecunditas.) (a. 2)

Tertio, alia processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante prius similitudine et pondere, deinde ut possessum per modum inhaesionis appetitus in bono. Et ad istam terminatur processio ad intra secundum intelligibilem emanationem. (a. 3)

Quarto, processio amoris non est generatio, quia non completur in ipsa similitudine, quae se habet per modum principii processionis quae est per modum impulsionis et impellentis. (non habet speciale nomen. Tamen 'Spiratio' -- "Tamquam advenientis spiritus vehementis".) (a. 4)

Quinto, Dei perfecta foecunditas manifestatur uno verbo et uno amore -- secundum duas operationes immanentes, quae solae Deo convenire possunt.

(b) De ipsis relationibus divinis, quae secundum processiones accipiuntur, et reales sunt. Q. 28.

Primo: 'Relatio' diversimode accipitur, et est terminus analogus. Relationes quae fundantur in processionibus ipsae reales sunt. (a. 1)

N.B. Sunt quater oppositiones. Sola oppositio relationis in Deo salvari potest, eo quod termini ejus non tollunt aliquid per modum negationis -- ut jam patet in relationibus paternitatis et filiationis. Et quia talis oppositio non facit divisionem in esse sed in respectu, in Deo inveniri potest. (a. 2)

Secundo: relatio in Deo idem est, cum sua essentia, (eo modo proportionaliter, actio est idem cum motu).

Tertio: et sunt reales et distinctae, quia quamvis non fundentur super extrema secundum se distincta, sed super illud quod distinctionem facit, scil. origo seu processio, quae extrema et respectus producit. Origo autem est communicativa naturae, non divisiva.

N.B. A.v. in God, there can be no distinct terms prior to the relations, between which terms the relation would occur. For whatever, in God, precedes relationship is absolute, not distinct, and wholly one. Hence it is that only procession and origination can found real relations that do not require extremes distinct and prior to these relations, whereas these in fact give rise to the extremes that are found in God. (The relations, in effect, are substantial, not accidental. (a. 3).

Plan of the Treatise

De Trinitate

Quarto: There are no such relations in God.

II. De Ipsiis Personis secundum se.

(a) Id quod est commune omnibus personis.

Primo: Quid est persona. (Q.29)

Secundo: Divisio seu pluralitas Personarum (Q.30).

Tertio: ea quae pluralitatem consequuntur et quomodo circa istam nominibus utendum sit. (Q.31)

Quarto: cognoscibilitas Personarum, et consequenter earum nominatio et discretio, quod fit per notionies. (Q.32)

(b) De Singulis Personis.

Primo: De Persona a Patris (Q.33)

Secundo: de Persona Filii quantum ad rationem et munus Verbi (Q.34)

Tertio: de Filio ut Imago (Q.35).

Quarto: De Persona Spiritus Sancti quantum ad rationem Spiritus (Q.36).

Quinto: Tum sumendo 'Spiritus' ut dicit impulsus et efficaciam voluntatis procedentem a Patre et Filio spirantibus; tum ut dilectio seu amor Spiritus (Q.37)

Sexto: de S. Spiritu in quantum est donum procedens et emissum a donante (Q.38).

III. Quinque comparationes Personarum.

Primo: in ordine ad essentiam quae illis terminatur et ad nomina essentialia quibus significantur (Q.39)

Secundo: Comparantur Personae ad relationes, quibus ut formis personalibus constituuntur Personae (Q.40).

Tertio: comparantur ad actus notionales secundum quos originantur Personae, vel producunt (Q.41)

Quarto: Comparantur Personae inter se quantum ad aequalitatem, magnitudinem, coaeternitatem, et similia (Q.42)

Quinto: comparantur quoad creaturas ad quas mittuntur Personae pro opere aliquo sanctificationis, in quo vel visibiliter apparent personae, vel invisibiliter habitant in anima per sanctificationem (Q.43).